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CHAPTER 4 
 THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this chapter is to explain the theoretical model of the study and develop 
testable hypotheses with regard to outsourcing, based on issues identified in the previous 
chapter. Based on the review of the literature in the previous chapter, Section 4.2 presents 
and discusses the theoretical model of the study. Following the theoretical framework, the 
hypotheses are then developed in Section 4.3. The chapter ends in Section 4.4 with a 
summary and conclusions. 
 
4.2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Based on the TCE theoretical model, this study examines asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty, behavioural uncertainty, frequency and trust as the most critical factors 
affecting outsourcing intensity (Rieple and Helm, 2008; McIvor, 2009; Thouin et al, 2009; 
Dibbern and Heinzl, 2009; Lee et al., 2008; Greenberg et al., 2008; Hansen and Morrow, 
2003; Verwaal et al., 2008). In addition, based on the RBV model, this study investigates 
variables such as technical competence and degree of competition, which are associated 
with SMEs' decisions to outsource (Blackburn et al., 2010; Carey et al., 2006; Gooderham 
et al., 2004). Furthermore, the RBV model is imperative to the study of outsourcing, which 
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link outsourcing to firm performance (McIvor, 2009; Gainey and Klaas, 2003; Roy and 
Aubert, 2002). Therefore, the theoretical model is shown in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1: The theoretical model 
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The RBV focuses on the source of an enterprise‘s competitive advantage as the basis for 
SME success and how a SME can maximise its value by utilizing internal and external 
resources and combining them (Blackburn et al., 2010; Barney, 1991, 2001). Furthermore, 
TCE model was identified as a useful model for understanding how professional 
accountants can help their SME clients to reduce transaction costs and thus enhance 
performance (Carey, 2008). 
Referring to the theoretical model, the study examines the relationship between the TCE 
and RBV variables (asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty, 
frequency, trust, technical competence and degree of competition), which are the 
independent variables and outsourcing intensity as the dependent variable. Additionally, 
this study examines the relationship between outsourcing intensity as an independent 
variable and firm performance as dependent variable. More importantly, the mediating role 
of outsourcing intensity on the association between all factors and firm performance is also 
investigated. 
 
4.3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
In this section the hypotheses regarding the relationships between the independent 
variables and dependent variable, ―outsourcing intensity‖ premised on the TCE and RBV 
theories discussed in previous chapters are developed. Hypotheses are also developed in 
respect of the relationships between a second dependent variable, i.e., ―firm performance‖ 
and outsourcing intensity as an independent variable. Moreover, hypotheses are drawn up 
to examine the mediating role of outsourcing on the relationship between the independent 
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variables (e.g., TCE and RBV factors) and firm performance. These hypotheses are 
developed as discussed next. 
 
4.3.1 The Relationship between Asset Specificity and Accounting Function 
Outsourcing Intensity  
Williamson (1989, p.142) noted that asset specificity turns to ―the degree to which an asset 
can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of 
productive value‖. TCE  perspective premises that the higher the asset specificity, the more 
firm specific the knowledge, language and routines become, the more likely a function will 
be processed internally (i.e. insourced) (Lamminmaki, 2005; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; 
Espino-Rodríguez et al., 2008). The RBV asserts that sourcing decisions is determined by 
the degree to which the firm can develop an idiosyncratic knowledge and routines and 
skills produced within the firm (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Aubert et al., 2004; Espino-
Rodríguez et al., 2008; Reeves et al., 2010). The RBV also promises the valuable firm-
specific knowledge often drives outsourcing decision (Espino-Rodríguez et al., 2008; 
Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Therefore, higher asset specificity is explained by costs that 
do not possess value outside the exchange association, and then leads to increase the costs 
of transaction (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). TCE argues while asset specificity of a service 
function intensifies, the function tends to be internalised as a consequence of the 
opportunistic behaviour that may otherwise result (Lamminmaki, 2007). For example, 
higher levels of asset specificity lead to a lower percentage of the accounting activities 
being outsourced (Jiang et al., 2007; Lamminmaki, 2007). In other words, accounting 
activities with lower asset specificity can be easily managed by external service providers 
(Everaert et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2007). This circumstance is more applicable for SMEs 
because SMEs face with internal resource gaps to carry out accounting functions 
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internally, so they can obtain supplementary value from professional accountants in the 
form of accounting functions (Everaert et al., 2006).  
To summarise the discussion, the proposition is that when asset specificity of the 
accounting functions increases, firms are expected to internalise those functions (Speklé et 
al., 2007). Conversely, low asset specificity of accounting functions would motivate firms 
to outsource accounting functions (Widener and Selto, 1999). Based on the above 
arguments, accounting functions should be externalise or outsourced when the assets in the 
accounting functions are not specific or have low specificity (e.g., low firm-specific 
routines, knowledge, language and skills) (Everaert et al., 2010; Espino-Rodríguez, et al., 
2008; Nicholson et al., 2004, 2006). In line with Everaert et al. (2010) and Nicholson et al. 
(2006), it is expected that, as accounting functions become more customised to a firm and 
more specialised, asset specificity rises and, accordingly, shifting accounting activities to a 
professional (external) accountant can be difficult and costly. Hence, the first hypothesis 
based on the above discussion is as follows: 
                H1: The higher the level of the asset specificity of accounting functions, the 
lower the accounting function outsourcing intensity  
 
4.3.2 The Relationship between Environmental Uncertainty and Accounting Function 
Outsourcing Intensity  
There are two constructs for uncertainty, comprising degrees of environmental uncertainty 
and behavioural uncertainty in the handling of an activity (Williamson, 1975, 1979; John 
and Weitz, 1988; Widener and Selto, 1999). If demand for an activity is volatile and 
unpredictable, an activity‘s environmental context may be uncertain (Lamminmaki, 2009). 
For instance, if demand for an activity is volatile and unpredictable (e.g., incomplete 
contracting), the firm cannot identify how much the activities involved in supporting the 
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service‘s provision are required (i.e., bookkeeping works) (Lamminmaki, 2007, 2009). 
Therefore, for impeding the problems related to incomplete contracting, TCE perspective 
holds that in the presence of higher environmental uncertainty in the activities, there is a 
greater probability for the activities to be managed internally (e.g., insourcing) 
(Lamminmaki, 2007, 2008, 2009; Nicholson et al., 2006).  
As discussed in earlier chapter, environmental uncertainty in the accounting functions 
relates to the predictability and stability of the accounting functions workload due to the 
volatility (unpredictability) of business activities (Everaert et al.,  2006, 2010; Nicholson et 
al., 2006). For instance, if the firm cannot to predict the workload related to accounting 
practices (e.g., low predictability and stability of the workload related to accounting 
functions), the costs of transaction will be increased as a consequence of renegotiating and 
changing of the contractual agreements with a professional accountant (Everaert et al., 
2010; Lamminmaki, 2007, 2008, 2009). This needs time that the managements of the 
SMEs may not have or may not be able to reduce the flexibility needed to deal with these 
fluctuations in the accounting functions workload in a well-timed fashion (Lamminmaki, 
2007; Nicholson et al., 2006; Aubert et al., 2004). In addition, if environmental uncertainty 
in accounting functions rises, it makes it extremely costly to write and implement a 
contract with a professional accountant, which indicates all achievable future conditions 
(Everaert et al., 2010). This produces many problems, which raise the costs of transaction 
(Aubert et al., 2004). Therefore, if the costs of transaction become too high, the transaction 
will not occur and accounting functions will be insourced (Nicholson et al., 2006; Aubert 
et al., 2004). In fact, when environmental uncertainty is too high, it will be impossible to 
agree on a contract with an accounting firm, thereby preventing professional accountants 
from processing accounting functions for SMEs (Nicholson et al., 2006; Aubert et al., 
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2004). In other words, if environmental uncertainty in accounting functions is lower, a 
higher degree of outsourcing of accounting activities is possible (Reeves et al., 2010; 
Kotabe and Mol, 2009; Nicholson et al., 2006; Aubert et al., 2004; Nam, Rajagopalan, Rao 
and Chaudhury, 1996). 
TCE perspective conjectures that in highly environmental uncertainty in accounting 
practices, firms prefer to process their accounting functions internally, believing that they 
can favorably answer to the market more quickly than professional accountants can do 
(Everaert et al., 2006, 2010; Ellram et al., 2008; Kaufmann and Carter, 2006; Vidal and 
Goetschalckx, 2000; Nicholson et al., 2006; Aubert et al., 2004). Therefore, the original 
argument maintains that a high environmental uncertainty in accounting functions, 
contracting will be incomplete, the costs of transaction will rise, and it is hard to attain an 
reasonable agreement with an external accountant (Kotabe and Mol, 2009; Lamminmaki, 
2007, 2008; Nicholson et al., 2006). For example, when the accounting functions workload 
is less predictable and stable, an in-house accountant is able to answer more rapidly to 
these fluctuations than professional (external) accountant can (Everaert et al., 2006, 2010; 
Williamson, 1991). Hence, it is hypothesised that: 
                H2: The higher the environmental uncertainty in accounting functions, the lower 
the accounting function outsourcing intensity 
 
 
4.3.3 The relationship between Behavioural uncertainty and Accounting Function 
Outsourcing Intensity  
Behavioural uncertainty refers to the difficulty of evaluating the quality of performance 
related to the managing of a function (Lamminmaki, 2007, 2009; Dibbern and Heinzl, 
2009). In fact, if it is difficult to control and monitor performance, or to know whether a 
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function has been correctly processed, service provider opportunism may result 
(Lamminmaki, 2007, 2009). For example, potentially high opportunism by the service 
providers can contribute to a firm‘s decision not to outsource their functions (Greenberg et 
al., 2008). Similarly, in accounting context, behavioural uncertainty is defined as the 
difficulty of appraising whether the accountant performed the accounting functions 
correctly. High behavioural uncertainty increases the costs of the transaction as a result of 
writing, monitoring, enforcing contracts, negotiating, and all related tasks made to preclude 
opportunistic behaviour (Nicholson et al., 2006). Accordingly, when a firm cannot assess 
the quality of performance related to the processing of an accounting function accurately, 
adequate contracts with external accountant will be costly to draft (i.e., if contributions 
from an external accountant cannot be evaluated correctly) (Everaert et al., 2010; 
Nicholson et al., 2006). Consequently, if it is difficult to appraise an professional 
accountant, then TCE premises that the accounting functions will not be provided by 
professional accountant, as the management of the SME chooses to monitor and control 
the performance of the in- house accountant directly (Everaert et al.,  2006, 2010).  In this 
context, it is more economical to insource the accounting functions, which provides the 
firm a legal right to monitor and control the actions of its staff directly (Lamminmaki, 
2007, 2009; Nicholson et al., 2006; Williamson 1985). For example, the TCE prediction is 
that higher behavioural uncertainty in accounting functions increases the costs of 
transaction, and the accounting functions will be performed internally (Everaert et al., 
2006, 2010; Lamminmaki, 2007; Nicholson et al., 2006). Conversely, SMEs outsource 
more readily their accounting functions having low behavioural uncertainty (Nicholson et 
al., 2006; Aubert et al., 2004). In this case, if SMEs face problems in monitoring and 
controlling the quality of idiosyncratic accounting functions, they are even more likely to 
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insource the accounting activities (Widener and Selto, 1999).  From the results, it is clear 
that behavioural uncertainty play a critical role in the accounting outsourcing intensity 
(Lamminmaki, 2007, 2009; Nicholson et al., 2006; Aubert et al., 1996, 2004). 
Accordingly, based on the discussion above, the hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
                H3: The higher the level of the behavioural uncertainty in accounting functions, 
the lower the accounting function outsourcing intensity 
 
4.3.4 The Relationship between Frequency and Accounting Function Outsourcing 
Intensity  
One of the important TCE factors is the frequency of the transactions (Williamson, 1999). 
For instance, according to TCE, frequency is referred to ―the repetitiveness and volume of 
similar transactions‖ (Lamminmaki, 2007, p.75).  Based on TCE, while the extent of a 
transaction increases, the transaction should be managed internally as a result of the 
production economies that can be achieved (Lamminmaki, 2007, 2009). In the context of 
accounting, Everaert et al., (2010) defend frequency as periodicity and size of the activity. 
It is stated that the periodicity and size of accounting functions have an effect on 
accounting function outsourcing intensity (Everaert et al., 2006, 2010; Lamminmaki, 2007; 
Speklé et al., 2007). Thus, it is indicated that the higher the frequency of transactions, the 
more likely insourcing will be adopted (Reeves et al., 2010). In view of that, TCE argues 
that the frequency of the transaction affects the sourcing decision (governance choice) 
because frequency of transactions will affect exposure to opportunism (Nicholson et al., 
2006; Reeves et al., 2010).  
TCE perspective seeks to economise on both cost of the transaction and production costs 
(Reeves et al., 2010). According to TCE, as the volume of accounting functions increases, 
differences in production costs between outsourced accounting practices and internally 
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sourced accounting practices reduce, because larger firms are better equipped to take 
advantage of economies of scale than smaller firms (Speklé et al., 2007; Everaert et al., 
2010). Thus, internalisation of transactions (insourcing of accounting activities) by the firm 
is only efficient for recurrent transactions (Aubert et al., 1996). An implication of this 
argument is that as frequency of accounting functions increases, SMEs prefer to develop 
such functions internally (Speklé et al., 2007; Everaert et al., 2010; Nicholson et al., 2006). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
           H4: The higher the frequency of accounting functions, the lower the accounting 
function outsourcing intensity 
 
4.3.5 The Association between Trust in Professional Accountant and Accounting 
Function Outsourcing Intensity 
The importance of trust in service provider-client relationships has been emphasised in 
many prior studies (Hansen and Morrow, 2003; Dyer and Chu, 2000; Zaheer, McEvily and 
Perrone, 1998; Moorman, Zaltman, Deshpande, 1992). Many recent studies on the 
governance of interfirm relationships (i.e., relationship between client and service 
provider) are based on transaction cost economics (TCE) (Greenberg et al., 2008; Verwaal 
et al., 2008; van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2006; Hansen and Morrow, 2003). For 
example, the social context in which transactions are embedded affects the relationship and 
the parties‘ behaviour (Greenberg et al., 2008). Therefore, the parties describe whether 
transactions should be performed through markets (buy), hierarchies (make), or hybrid 
arrangements to organise trust as an important factor impacting outsourcing decisions 
(Greenberg et al., 2008). Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) argue trust in external 
service provider is developed via relationship between parties to help in minimising 
potential opportunism. It is precisely through such a relationship, which is ‗earned‘ by 
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building up trust, that the SME owner/manager can tap into the accounting firm‘s expertise 
and knowledge of business processes in different sectors of the economy (Blackburn et al., 
2010). Hence, trust will reduce the fear of opportunism among client and supplier, so that 
transaction costs can be reduced (Verwaal et al., 2008). Thus, trust in outside supplier is as 
an important element in minimizing transaction costs (Hansen and Morrow, 2003; 
Bromiley and Harris, 2006; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Andaleeb, 1992), and is a 
source of competitive advantage (Barney and Hansen 1994). When there is trust, the 
formal control mechanisms may be reduced, and firm has a propensity to open 
communication and outsourcing (Verwaal et al., 2008). 
Greenberg et al., 2008 (2008) used TCE and the information systems (IS) 
conceptualisations of trust to offer clients and suppliers a framework to identify the issues 
involved in business process outsourcing. Consequently, this study revealed that trust had a 
critical role in outsourcing intensity (Greenberg et al., 2008). Das and Teng (1998) viewed 
that trust and control had significant roles in producing confidence that suppliers did not 
behave opportunistically. Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) extended the TCE 
framework by including trust as one of the efficient solutions to control in hybrid 
transactions during the three stages of interfirm relationships (contact, contract and 
control).  This study revealed that the notion of trusted partners into TCE model needed at 
each of the stages. Further, Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) used TCE model by 
discussing trust for each of three elements (the transaction, the transaction environment 
and the parties). TCE is valuable because it identifies the factors such as trust in outside 
supplier when decisions about outsourcing are made (Greenberg et al., 2008; Verwaal et 
al., 2008; Hansen and Morrow, 2003). In this study, TCE perspective is used as the 
underlying theory for developing a framework that recognises the role of trust in 
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outsourcing decision (Greenberg et al., 2008; Bromiley and Harris, 2006). The reason is 
that owner-managers of SMEs emphasised the importance of trust in outsourcing as a basis 
for continuing the relationship with professional accountants (Everaert et al., 2006, 2010; 
Blackburn et al., 2010). For example, it stands to reason that if trust was critical in the 
decision to put in an alliance, it can play an important role in subsequent outsourcing 
decisions (Hansen and Morrow, 2003). 
Siakas and Siakas (2008) indicated that trust in service provider is an important factor in 
improving outsourcing relationships, both breadth-wise and depth-wise. Chiles and 
McMackin (1996) demonstrate that trust plays a significant role in cooperation and trust is 
relevant aspect of governance structure. Kim et al. (2007) and Verwaal et al. (2008) 
suggest that trust is critical driver affecting the intention of adopting outsourcing. 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) examined the effect of trust on outsourcing, and found that 
trust turned out to be significant for entry mode choices in outsourcing.  
Bennett and Robson (1999) examined the level of perceived trust between the supplier of 
assistance and the SMEs. SMEs perceived that professional accountants were in a position 
of high trust (Bennett and Robson, 1999). Blackburn et al. (2010) and Blackburn and Jarvis 
(2010) indicated that while competence was found to be critical before a SME 
owner/manager relied on their professional accountant, trust is needed to facilitate the 
exchange. In fact, the trust in professional accountants appeared to arise from their 
qualified and certified position from frequent communication within the community 
(Marlow and Carter, 2005). Bennett and Robson (1999), Gooderham et al. (2004), 
Blackburn and Jarvis (2010), Blackburn et al. (2010) and Everaert et al. (2006, 2010) 
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report that trust is a crucial foundation of the SME – professional accountant relationship6 
and this provides a stage for the potential take-up of non-compliance services. Bachmann 
(2001) demonstrated that the SMEs decide to outsource their functions is based on the 
characteristics of the transaction and the trust. Consequently, trust in external accountant is 
important driver in outsourcing of accounting practices in SME environment (Everaert et 
al., 2010).  
Trust facilitates exchanges in uncertain conditions because of the expectation that service 
provider will not exploit vulnerabilities (Hansen and Morrow, 2003; Verwaal et al., 2008; 
Barney and Hansen, 1994; Rousseau et. al., 1998). Therefore, the most important effect of 
trust on the outsourcing decision lies in the expectation that suppliers will perform the 
service functions in accordance with agreement with the interests of the clients (Hansen 
and Morrow, 2003). Hansen and Morrow (2003) and Verwaal et al. (2008) argue that trust 
is one of the factors influencing the outsourcing decision. Indeed, there is increasing 
evidence reported in the literature confirming the importance of trust in outsourcing 
intensity (Greenberg et al., 2008; Verwaal et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2007; Oza et al., 2006; 
Hansen and Morrow, 2003; Sabherwal, 1999).  
The notion of ―trust‖ is extensively discussed in the business and management literature 
and is regarded as critical in commercial exchange (Hansen and Morrow, 2003; Verwaal et 
al., 2008). Trust is seen as developing through an ongoing relationship and helps facilitate 
an understanding of mutual needs whilst minimizing uncertainties (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
A priori, professional accountants appear to be well placed to benefit from a number of 
dimensions of trust (Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; Blackburn et al., 2010). They benefit 
                                                             
6 It is also important for listed companies and professional accountants but such relations exist in a regulated 
environment with oversight from Securities commission etc. 
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from the trust that derives from being a member of a government regulated profession, 
which provides continuous professional development, codes of conduct such as ethics and 
data protection, trading standards, discipline and enforcement (Hansen and Morrow, 2003; 
Verwaal et al., 2008). Such institutional regulations are not prevalent amongst other 
external service providers (Hansen and Morrow, 2003; Verwaal et al., 2008). A further 
dimension to trust is the behavioral aspect which derives from an ongoing relationship 
between SME executives and their professional accountants (Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; 
Blackburn et al., 2010). Therefore, professional accountants can cultivate ―relational‖ trust 
based on their repeated provision of compliance services to SMEs (Blackburn and Jarvis, 
2010; Blackburn et al., 2010). For example, trust can be developed when multi-stop-
shopping occurs and SME executives develop a more rational and critical assessment of 
professional accountants‘ proficiency (Everaert et al., 2010). The evidence suggests the 
―trust‖ is one of the main reasons why SMEs draw on professional accountants for 
accounting activities. 
TCE model explains that the more trust the SME client perceives; the higher outsourcing 
of accounting functions is used (Hansen and Morrow, 2003). This can be particularly 
significant for SMEs, given the role of trust may be rather unique for the accountants' 
services or the role of the owner/manager and the inter-personal nature of trust (Martin, 
2005). Following Bouthers and Bouthers (2003), Verwaal et al. (2008), Hansen and 
Morrow (2003), Greenberg et al.(2008), and Everaert et al. (2010), it is argued that, if the 
professional accountant and the management of the SME sustain a trust-based relationship, 
opportunism will not be of concern.  As a result, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
            H5: The higher the level of trust of the SME owner/manager in the professional 
accountant, the higher the accounting function outsourcing intensity 
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4.3.6 The Association between Technical Competence and Accounting Function 
Outsourcing Intensity  
Technical competence of a professional accountants refers to appropriate qualifications and 
experience, necessary specialised skills, industry specialisation and technological expertise 
(Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; Carey et al., 2006). Technical competence is one of the core 
principles in the code of ethics for professional accountants, yet there appears to be an 
expectation gap regarding the competence of the professional accountant to provide 
accounting and professional services (Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; Blackburn et al., 2010). 
The accounting firm is a potential source of critical competencies for survival and 
development of SMEs (Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; Blackburn et al., 2010). 
Demonstration of an accountant‘s competence is critical before a firm owner-manager of 
SME will rely on professional accountant (Blackburn et al., 2010).  
It is argued that external service providers are well placed to provide a comparative 
advantage over internal service providers because they possess industry specialisation and 
professionals and the latest technological resources, who are competent, specialists and 
experienced (Carey et al., 2006; Anderson, 1996; Powell, 1997; Barr and Chang, 1993). 
For example, many claim professional accountants have the necessary scale to acquire 
resources, whereas the internal provision for the services often is too low to permit for a 
cost-efficient service, (Everaert et al., 2007; Barrar, Jones, Vedovato and Wood, 2002). 
Furthermore, the majority SME owner/managers have no management, capacity, 
professional and other formal qualifications (Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; Stanworth and 
Gray, 1992). Therefore, they rely on external accountants to achieve special knowledge, 
skills and experiences to improve their capacity (Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; Everaert et 
al., 2006; Greer et al., 1999). For example, SMEs regularly are deficient in these necessary 
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technical expertise and skills, whereas professional accountants often are extremely 
specialised in this matter (Everaert et al., 2006, 2007).  
While professional accountants are perceived to be competent in providing services to 
SMEs, some SMEs believed that professional accountants do not possess the necessary 
skills to add value through providing services for their specific industry (Blackburn and 
Jarvis, 2010; Blackburn et al., 2010). For example, Barr and Chang (1993) assert that 
external service providers often do not possess the same level of client industry 
specialisation and specific knowledge as internal accountant. This shows an expectation 
gap exists between what the SME executives need and what the external accountants are 
able to provide for them (Blackburn et al., 2010).  
In many cases, external suppliers are better able perform an activity than smaller firms 
carry out internally because they provide services for multiple clients, and they specialise 
in a variety of similar outputs, to provide the necessary services (Strange, 2009). In fact, 
the better competence of the external service providers than internal service providers is 
often the result of methodology and human resources and a high investment in technology 
over a period of time (Espino Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2004). Hence, professional 
accountants enable SMEs to obtain a broader perspective of both their information 
processing capacity and information needs, so that it is expected that SMEs applying them 
to achieve higher degrees of competitive advantage (Blackburn et al., 2010; Ismail and 
King, 2007). In this context, the knowledge and competence can be transferred to firms 
choosing for outsourcing, since, with their competences and processes, outside supplier 
will satisfy the needs of their clients (Espino Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2004; 
Naderian, 2010). Many outsourcing relationships are motivated by a firm‘s need to acquire 
technical competence and in-depth skills in a cost-beneficial manner (Greenberg et al., 
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2008). For example, firm competences and resources are a firm-level indicator of what 
should be outsourced (Barney, 1999). According to RBV, a firm with a rich competence 
base can be organised for undertaking its activity within the firm (Gooderham et al, 2004; 
Everaert et al., 2006, 2007; Kotabe and Mol, 2009). For those firms that are lack of 
expertise and competence, outsourcing is more appropriate (Kotabe and Mol, 2009). In 
fact, given that the competence these qualifications signify significant, this constitutes a 
dilemma for the SMEs performance (growth) (Gooderham et al, 2004). 
The RBV of the firm has been utilised over the last decade to explain the outsourcing 
(Espino-Rodríguez and Rodríguez-Díaz, 2008). The outsourcing literature incorporates 
RBV with competence considerations in outsourcing decisions (Gooderham et al, 2004; 
Barney, 1999; Leiblein, Reuer, Dalsace, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). According to the 
RBV, technical competence of professional accountant provides one of the most influential 
frameworks to explain why firms outsource their functions (Carey et al., 2006; Gilley and 
Rasheed, 2000; Carey, 2008; Blackburn et al., 2010). The RBV suggests that firms facing 
with resource gaps (lack expertise or competence) can outsource the activities to 
supplement their resources and competences, thus improving its strategy to make better 
utilisation of its capabilities for external opportunities.  
Central to the outsourcing decision is the issue of whether or not an external service 
provider (supplier) can process a function better than in-house service provider (Hansen 
and Morrow, 2003). Competence of outside supplier is a critical factor influences a firm‘s 
decision to outsource a business function (Hansen and Morrow, 2003). SME executives 
may recognise that an outside service provider has more competence and expertise in a 
certain business function than internal service provider (Hansen and Morrow, 2003). 
Accordingly, the perception that an external service provider possesses more competent 
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and expertise than an internal service provider in a particular business function affects the 
outsourcing decision (Hansen and Morrow, 2003). Owner/managers of SME who find that 
external service provider has more expertise than internal service provider would likely 
choose to outsource in the absence of any tension due to the need to monitor and control a 
function (Hansen and Morrow, 2003). In effect, firm executives who are convinced that 
external service providers possess superior competence may tend to outsource their 
activities (Hansen and Morrow, 2003). 
Gooderham et al. (2004) found that competence of the external accountants is the most 
important predictor of an SME‘s reliance on them as business adviser. SMEs rated very 
highly the technical competence of professional accountants in relation to accounting 
services (Leung et al., 2008). Accordingly, technical competence is an important factor 
affecting a firm decision to outsource because accounting functions do not only require 
knowledge of generally-accepted accounting principles but also need that an accounting 
specialist to apply the principles in a business environment (Everaert et al., 2006, 2007). 
Empirical evidence on outsourcing in other service functions, such as information 
Technology, business function and internal audit, suggests that technical competence is a 
significant factor in the decision to outsource (Beaumont and Costa, 2002; Hansen and 
Morrow, 2003; Carey et al., 2006). Similarly, it is predicted that perceptions of 
professional accountants‘ technical competence will influence the firm‘s decision to 
outsource their accounting functions (Carey et al., 2006). Consequently, the earlier 
arguments are summarised in the following hypothesis: 
              H6: The stronger the perception that external (professional) accountants are more 
technically competent than the in-house accountants, the higher the 
accounting function outsourcing intensity  
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4.3.7 The Association between Degree of Competition and Accounting Function 
Outsourcing Intensity  
In this globalised era, new technologies have emerged, customer culture has changed and 
competition is intense (Espino Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2004). With enhanced 
levels of competition, many smaller firms have recognised the difficulties of developing 
and maintaining the range of skills and expertise essential to compete effectively 
(Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003; Gooderham et al., 2004; Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; 
Blackburn et al., 2010). The outsourcing has been realised as a source of competitive 
advantage to the extent that it aims at a higher value for the fims (Jayabalan et al., 2009). 
Many firms recognise outsourcing as a skillful technique to achieve firm's high value 
(Smith, Morris and Ezzamel, 2005; Kim et al., 2007; Espino Rodríguez and Padrón-
Robaina, 2004). With  increased global competition and the reduction of the life cycle of 
business processes, most firms are moving to employ business process outsourcing, by 
outsourcing the total or part of their business activities to external service providers and 
focusing on their essential (core) business, in order to improve their performance (Kim et 
al., 2007; Espino Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2004). Outsourcing makes firms more 
dynamic and flexible and better able to face the changes and opportunities that occur 
(Espino Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2004).  
Kotabe et al (2008) indicated that in a highly competitive environment, many firms 
outsource activities to outside suppliers. Furthermore, many firms have broadened the 
scope of outsourcing to cover essential activities because of keen market competition and 
the pressure to stay lean (Hui and Tsang, 2006). In fact, many firms outsource their service 
functions to achieve competitive advantage (maximise the benefits) and minimise the costs 
(Hui and Tsang, 2006). In fact, as competitive pressures intensify, there is remarkable 
pressure for a SME is to obtain competitive advantage and improve its performance 
128 
 
(Gooderham et al., 2004; Blackburn et al., 2010; Hui and Tsang, 2006). Outsourcing of 
non-core activities is the preferred strategy of many firms to stay lean in competitive 
market (Hui and Tsang, 2006). In order to make economical use of limited resources, 
various strategies should be used in line with the decision matrix of outsourcing purpose 
and outsourcing scope in smaller firms (Hui and Tsang, 2006). Outsourcing is most useful 
in competitive markets and has an effect of strengthening price-based competition (Kotabe 
and Mol, 2009). Outsourcing is proving to be a reliance on technical experts and growth 
industry (Matusik and Hill, 1998). The rationale for outsourcing of accounting functions is 
chiefly stated in economic terms in a competitive environment, such as reduction in costs, 
managing the firms‘ capacity more efficiently, and to enhance firm performance 
(Jayabalan et al., 2009; Rittenberg and Covaleski, 2001). Accordingly, to meet the value 
creation challenge for their businesses, SME executives look more and more to 
outsourcing (Everaert et al., 2006, 2007, 2010; Jayabalan et al., 2009; Quélin and 
Duhamel, 2003).  
Accounting functions play an important role in competitive environment to sustain 
competitive advantages (Jayabalan et al., 2009).  However, most of SMEs face problem in 
handling their accounting functions (Jayabalan et al., 2009). Consequently, in a 
competitive environment, smaller firms cannot survive because their internal resource gaps 
do not permit them to adapt their products (Gooderham et al., 2004). In such 
circumstances, outsourcing is a major managerial method to obtain competitive advantage 
while competitive pressures intensify (Delmotte and Sels, 2008). As such, one possible 
way to reduce competitive pressure and gain sufficient resource is to employ qualified 
persons (Gooderham et al., 2004). However, given the insufficient number of qualified 
professional accountants, it is expected that SMEs will outsource accounting functions to 
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professional accountants (Devi and Samujh, 2010; Everaert et al., 2006, 2007; Berry, 
Sweeting, and Goto, 2006). Accordingly, professional accountants can provide 
opportunities to encourage SME owner-managers to cope with succession issues by 
applying their technical and commercial expertise and broader industry perspectives to 
knowledge of SMEs‘ succession situations gained from other aspects of client-accountant 
relationships (Martin, 2005). Indeed, outsourcing of accounting functions has been 
recognised as a source of competitive benefit in as much as it aims at a higher value for the 
SMEs (Jayabalan et al., 2009). Although market issues are not regulated as are accounting 
issues, Pineda, Lerner, Miller and Phillips (1998) reported that owner-managers of smaller 
firm also see market issues as accounting issue. Thus, SME executives may consider this 
area of expertise in the same approach as they apply to accounting matters; they may 
engage professional accountant when they face competitive pressures (Devi and Samujh, 
2010; Blackburn and Jarvis, 2010; Blackburn et al., 2010; Gooderham et al, 2004).  
The RBV suggests SMEs utilise resources available outside when they face competitive 
pressures (Gooderham et al., 2004; Worrall, 2007). In effect, in competitive environment, 
the RBV provides an approach that regards the firm as a set of resources and capabilities 
those firms can outsource their accounting activities in order to focus on its core business 
to sustain competitiveness (Arnold, 2000). For example, in the competitive environments, 
the smaller firms are becoming more needy, and need to become more capable both 
operationally and strategically (Devi and Samujh, 2010; Blackburn et al., 2010; Worrall, 
2007). As competitive pressures intensify, smaller firms have to find a way to grow and 
obtain competitive advantage (Delmotte and Sels, 2008; Gooderham et al., 2004), 
outsourcing is as a best way to attain this goal. For instance, outsourcing has become a 
vital element of business improvement initiatives and firm restructuring (McIvor et al., 
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2009). Using RBV perspective, Gooderham et al. (2004) argue that when SMEs face with 
vulnerable competition, they refer to their external accountant as a potential source of 
competitive advantage. For instance, professional accountants are well placed to help the 
managements of the SMEs to systematise routine business procedures in order that they 
themselves can concentrate on the development of exit routes and strategy (Martin, 2005).  
Libby and Waterhouse (1996) indicate the importance of designing accounting systems 
that are suitable for specific competitive environments. For example, in a study of 300 
listed large firms, Guilding and McManus (2002) report a positive relationship between 
competition intensity and client accounting usage. Although Lamminmaki (2007) used 
contingency theory to describe degree of competition in outsourcing, but it is appropriate 
to examine degree of competition based on resource-based perspective in SME 
environment (Blackburn et al., 2010; Gooderham et al., 2004). For example, using RBV, 
Gooderham et al. (2004) assert that smaller firm is not able to survive as competitive 
pressures intensify because its narrow resource base does not allow it to adapt its products 
or services. Appraising the impact of degree of competition on outsourcing allows this 
study to build on a stream of study initiated by Lamminmaki (2007). To survive in a 
competitive environment, SMEs need to use professional accountants as source of 
competitive advantage (Devi and Samujh, 2010; Blackburn et al., 2010). Therefore, degree 
of competition appears an important variable to this study when one considers the varying 
competition intensity experienced by SMEs (Blackburn et al., 2010). As outsourcing can 
assist greater specialisation and efficiencies, a higher degree of outsourcing is expected for 
those SMEs that are faced with high levels of competition intensity (Lamminmaki, 2007). 
Although there is no empirical study in accounting to examine directly the effect of degree 
of competition on outsourcing of the accounting function, evidence on outsourcing in other 
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activities (housekeeping, food and beverage, and  general maintenance) suggests that 
degree of competition is a significant factor in outsourcing intensity (Lamminmaki, 2007). 
Accordingly, the above arguments are summarised in the following hypothesis: 
         H7: The stronger the competitive pressures faced by the firm, the higher the 
accounting function outsourcing intensity 
  
4.3.8 The Association between Accounting Function Outsourcing Intensity and Firm 
Performance 
Many claim outsourcing improve a firm performance (Cho et al., 2008; Jiang et al. 2006; 
Gilleyet al., 2004a; Espino Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2004). For example, a major 
concern of the RBV is how a firm‘s resource develops and influences its performance 
(McIvor, 2009; Marshall et al., 2007). Therefore, firms will likely achieve higher levels of 
firm performance if they choose to outsource their functions to outside specialists (Gilley 
et al., 2004a). In line with the RBV of the firm, outsourcing can lead to superior resources 
becoming competitive advantages, which in turn leads to improve firm performance 
(Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2005). Effectively, the outsourcing decision is 
affected by the ability of a firm to invest in developing a resource and supporting a better 
performance and competitive advantage in the capacity compared with competitors 
(McIvor, 2009; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). Furthermore, TCE was identified as a useful 
model for understanding how professional accountants will help SMEs to reduce 
transaction costs and thus improve performance (Carey, 2008). Taken as a whole, three 
important reasons are stated that outsourcing will enhance SME performance (Holcomb 
and Hitt, 2007). The first reason is that outsourcing potentially reduces bureaucratic 
complexity (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). The second reason is that outsourcing allows SMEs 
to meet production requirements and provides a mechanism for firms to share economies 
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of scale with specialised service provider from outside, transfer risk and reduce uncertainty 
(Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). For example, outsourcing may result in a reduction in  
investments in certain facilities and equipment, hence,  production costs and overhead 
decline, which in turn reduces firms‘ break-even points, enhancing the firm performance, 
particularly in SME environment (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). The last reason is that when 
outsourcing is more efficient, SMEs are more likely to integrate and use specialised 
resources and capacity (Blackburn et al., 2010; Devi and Samujh, 2010; Holcomb and Hitt, 
2007). Overall, outsourcing seems not only to demonstrate positive benefits for cost 
reduction, but also improve overall firm performance (Hsiao et al., 2010; Kern and Blois, 
2002). However, according to the above arguments, it is hypothesised that accounting 
function outsourcing intensity is associated with firm performance.  
                H8: Accounting function Outsourcing Intensity is positively associated with 
firm performance 
 
4.3.9 The Mediating Role of the Accounting Function Outsourcing Intensity 
When the internal transaction costs are equal to the external transaction costs of processing 
some functions, the firms should stop processing those functions internally and outsource 
such functions to external sources to improve the firm performance (Espino-Rodríguez et 
al., 2008; McIvor, 2009; Marshall et al., 2007). The TCE and RBV posit that production 
efficiency requires specialised human assets are factors critical to a firm performance 
(Poppo and Zenger, 1998). For example, when a function is specific and a firm decides to 
outsource that function, there will be a negative effect on firm performance in accordance 
with TCE perspective (Espino-Rodríguez et al., 2008). In other words, for firms with lower 
levels of asset specificity of the service function outsourcing will lead to better 
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performance than firms with higher levels of asset specificity of the service functions 
(Thouin et al., 2009). When level of transaction costs is too low, firms that outsource a 
greater number of their service functions, therefore will achieve an enhanced firm 
performance (Thouin et al., 2009). Furthermore, effect of trust on outsourcing of service 
functions is critical and can increase the likelihood of firm performance (Sabherwal, 1999). 
Trust in supplier is suggested to enhance firm performance and competitive advantage 
(Lane and Bachmann, 2001). Kanawattanachai and Yoo (2002) note that trust in external 
service provider is critical  factor affecting the business relationships and outsourcing 
decision as it enables more open communication, and improve firm performance with 
greater satisfaction in the decision making process. Besides, competition is clearly 
important in a firm performance (Chew, Yan and and Cheah, 2008). Competitive 
environment determines the relative competitive position and SME performance (Chew et 
al., 2008). Based on RBV, SME competence and capacity has direct impacts on 
construction of SME performance (Chew et al., 2008). Thus, there is the fit among 
competence, competitive position and SME performance (Chew et al., 2008). The 
competition condition is the strategic choice that can influence SME performance (Chew et 
al., 2008). In fact, firm competence levels are classically linked to firm performance 
(Boucher, Bonjour and Grabot, 2007). To date, although no research that has analysed 
mediating role of accounting function outsourcing, but there is a limited research in other 
service functions examined mediating role of outsourcing. For example, Lilly et al., (2005) 
have examined the role of human resource function outsourcing as mediator between the 
degree of competition and firm performance in a conceptual model. Furthermore, in an 
empirical study, Abdul- Halim (2009) examined mediating effect of the human resource 
function outsourcing on the relationship between business strategies and firm performance. 
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Besides, Cho et al. (2008) examine mediator role of logistics outsourcing on the 
relationship between logistics capability and firm performance. Regarding earlier 
discussions, this study proposes that accounting function outsourcing intensity may play a 
mediating role in the relationship between the asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, 
behavioural uncertainty, frequency, trust, technical competence and degree of competition, 
and firm performance. Hence, hypotheses are as follows:  
 
              H9: Accounting function outsourcing intensity mediates the relationship between 
asset specificity and firm performance 
 
             H10: Accounting function outsourcing intensity mediates the relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and firm performance 
 
             H11: Accounting function outsourcing intensity mediates the relationship between 
behavioral uncertainty and firm performance 
 
             H12: Accounting function outsourcing intensity mediates the relationship between 
frequency and firm performance 
 
             H13: Accounting function outsourcing intensity mediates the relationship between 
trust in accountant and firm performance 
 
             H14: Accounting function outsourcing intensity mediates the relationship between 
technical competence and firm performance 
 
             H15: Accounting function outsourcing intensity mediates the relationship     
between degree of competition and firm performance 
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4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Drawing on the literature, this chapter has developed hypotheses to examine the research 
questions developed in Chapter 4. The next chapter discusses the research methodology 
and research design to examine the hypotheses developed in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
